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Dr. Segall's discourse on metaphors of agency and
mechanisms in dissociation poses intriguing questions and
answers. However, his contribution evokes many questions
in need of answers before one would be fully able to appre-
ciate its message.
Segall uses many concepts at different logical levels or
concepts which are used in other contexts at a different level,
which may foster confusion in the reader. An example of
the former is his speaking ofboth various metaphors for the
dissociation of the psyche and ofdissociation as one of these
metaphors. An example of the latter pertains to his refer-
ring to Sarbin's narrative and role theory, as well as Herman
and Kempe's polyphonic variation. My familiarity with the
Janetian distinction between narrative-autobiographical
memories and traumatic memories lacking that narrative
quality interferes with just being able to accept the narrative
metaphors ofSarbin, Herman, and Kempe. This may be my
idiosyncratic problem, but I am afraid that it is indicative of
Segall's too quick and too briefapplication ofsuch theoretical
notions and fragments to the phenomenon of dissociation
and the dissociative disorders. Thus, Herman and Kempe's
model of the self as a polyphonic model seems to imply that
all of us are "multiples," a view also encountered in pop psy-
chology but hardly acceptable to those of us having some
understanding of the dissociative disorders. And Bowers'
important theory of dissociated control in hypnosis, sug-
gesting an absence oflower subsystems by superordinate con-
trol systems, is just mentioned in passing.
Segall hardly defines his concepts, which leaves
untouched the problems inherent in these concepts, thus
making the discourse of the central theme in his essay par-
ticularly problematic. Should we view dissociation as a func-
tionally autonomous process occurring within a person, or
as something one does with an intent? Is it a mechanis!'ic or
an agentic phenomenon? His resolution of this dilemma is
to state that both descriptions are right to some degree, but
that, depending on the circumstances, we as clinicians
should emphasize one or the other. It would be very inter-
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esting to discuss some of these circumstances. However, we
first need a clear definition of dissociation, the basic phe-
nomenon this essay deals with. We also need to be specific
as to whether discussion is to be regarded as a phenomenon
to be placed on a continuum (as the older view in the cur-
rent DD field implied) or as a latent class or "pathological
dissociative taxon" (Waller, Putnam, & Carlson, 1996),
whereby the latter has to be differen tiated from related phe-
nomena such as absorption and imaginary involvement,
which are normal human phenomena. Indeed,Janet, who
was the first to draw attention to this fundamental distinc-
tion, did not regard absorption and imaginary involvement
as dissociation per se. In recent times, his view was support-
ed by authors such as Boon and Draijer (1993), Van der Hart,
Boon and Op den Velde (1991), Yates and Nasby (1993),
and has recently been confirmed by important research done
by Waller et al. (1996).
When there exists some clarity in this respect, I guess
that we are better prepared to relate dissociation with agen-
cy and intentionality as opposed to object and autonomous
(mechanistic) process, as well as with defining these con-
soucts in the current context. Which are the criteria deter-
mining whether or not one may speak of agency in a given
case? May we do so when somebody claims to have deliber-
ately dissociated? ot by definition, 1 think. Such attribution
may be incorrect. I am reminded here of the many experi-
ments with post-hypnotic suggestions, in which the subjects
gave post-hoc explanations of agency to their probably auto-
matic execution of these suggestions. DID patients may some-
times attribute personal control to manifestations stemming
from other identities (passive influence phenomena). How
does Segall view this? And what are the arguments in favor
of either an agentic or mechanistic view of dissociation, or
the arguments in support of the view that sometimes one
view is most appropriate and at other times the other. Indeed,
I feel it is a major omission that he has not dealt with the
question of when either one of these views would be most
appropriate.
In this commentary I would like to mention one per-
spective to the basic phenomenon of dissociation, in par-
ticular, pathological or trauma-induced dissociation, which
may perhaps shed some light on this issue. This perspective
includes the distinction ofseveral "levels" ofdissociation (cf.
DISSOCIATIOX, 1'01. IX. Jlio. 3. Septemberl996
Van der Hart, 1994; Van der Kolk, Van der Hart & Marmar,
1996). Primary dWodalioli refers to llu.; basic dividedness
between an apparcntl)' normal personality Slate and a U"aU'
malic personaliry state with its fixed ideas and disturbances
of functions. Emphasizing lhe exiSlencc ofa sen.se ofselfof
Ihese Sllltc.:S, tlol)'crs (1940) spoke of the Memotianal person-
alit},M and the Mapparem normal personaliry. - Thiscondition
seems 10 charaClerize simple Irr'SD, although 11m to such a
dc.:grcc thallQ(al amnc..-sia for the lr.tumalic c~perienceexists.
Seamdary dissociation refers to further dissociationwithill the
U<tumatic state. Dissociation between the observing and expe-
riencing paruorthe ego during a Ir.-lUInalic experience and
thereafter during its reactivation is one form of sllch sec-
ondary dissociation (also GlUed "perilraUlllatic dissocia-
tion~: Marmar ct aI., 1994). Anolher fonn pertains l.O the
dissociation of. or within, the components of the traumatic
experience it.selr, such as its somato-scl1sory, affectivc. and
behavioral affects. Nijenhuisand colleagues make important
comparisons between some of these secondary dissociative
states and animal defensh'e and recuperau\'e states that arc
e\'oked in the faceofse\'ere threm (Nijenhuis, Vanderlinden,
& Spin hoven, in press; Nijenhuis. Spinhm'en, Vanderlinden
ela!., in press). 'J'rrtial)'dinociatio" refen to the furtherde\'el-
opment ofego celllers which comain the traumatic experi.
ences and ego celHers which remain un:no.'<lre of the trauma
and its concomitant affects and which continue to perform
the routine functions ofdaily life. Tertiarydissociation is most
developed in 010.
Now, to which degree can we describe these \'<lrious dis-
sociauve phenomena as agenuc or mcchanic? Should we
regard them, as Scg-dll proposed, as both? Personally, I tend
to speak in terms ofvolunmry cOl1u'ol \'eI'SUS amomatic (as
opposed to mechanistic) dissociati\'C responscs, and I assume
that botll primary and secondary dissociation consist ofrapid
automatic responses which are, under cenain conditions,
evoked by threat to one's physical and psychological integri-
ty. I guess that the development of teniary dissociation as a
response to stressful conditions has, in fact, the same char-
acteristics. I-Io\\'e"er, existing ego centers also exhibit vol-
untary actions. A&rain, we are reminded in this respect that
what is voluntary for one ego center should be inmluntary
(MautomaticM) for anotheregocellter\\'hen confronted ....'ith
it (even when taking responsibility for it).
111e lauer point has been a subje<:t ofdebate among 19th
century French scientisLS on the nalure of dissociative
actions. Manyofthem belic\'t.:d that these acts are perfonned
unconsciously and merefore muhallically (cr. Despine, 1880).
Ilowe\'er, like predecessors such as Main de Biran. Moreau
de Tour, and Taine.JaneL (1889) reg-dfded dissociative phe-
nomena as psychological automatisms: automatic because
they arc reactivated response patterns, and psychological
because they are accompanied by sensibility and conscious-
ness.Janel believed that these dissociative behavior patlerns
are influenced by conscious factOrs, cven though they arc
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maladaptj\'e departures from the habitual response patterns
of the personality. (However. regarding them as response
patterns originally developing in the face of unavoidable
shock doc'S not make them maladaptive; onl)' the person's
continuous rel}ing on them would be seen as such.) sing
Lhe term aulomalic did not exclude the notion ofself-a....~<lre­
ness, as the Greek tenlls all/os (self) and maimomai (stri\ing
for. to exert onselffor) are paired in this concept (Van der
Hart & Horst, 1989). Janet stated that in psychological
automatism, consciousness docs nOI belong to the person-
al perception, and lacks the personality's sense of self (idee
dll 11I0i). This dissociative consciousness exists at a subcon-
scious level, but is able either to take over executive comrol
(complete automatism or complete dissociation) or to
invade personal consciousness (partial automatism or par·
tial dissociation).
Some carly 20th centllry commentators believed that
Janet did not atlribute to sllch dissociative consciousness its
own sense of self. I believe that Segall is concerned with a
similar issllc. At times Janet scellls to have used a language
which indeed emphasized mechanistic aspects of dissocia·
tion. Thus. in defining hysteria, Le.• the broad class of dis-
5()ciative disorders in a generic sense. he referred to -the dis-
sociation and emancipation of the systems of ideas and
functions which (b)' their s),nthesis;Janet 1909} constitute
personality~ Uanel., 1907, p. 332). Mitchell (1992) com·
mented:
-So, therefore, when an idea becomes dissociated,
he Uanet} would seem to imply that it continues LO
exist in a wholly isolated state and, whether con-
scious or unconscious, docs nOI belong to any self.
!lUI iL cannot be too often repeated and insisted on
that we have absolutely no knowledge of any such
isolated rnentalll1aterial. If normally an experience
that passes out of consciousness is conserved as a
psychical disposition, it is as a psychical disposition
of some personality. Ifit is nOldissociated, it remains
part of the nonnal personality and retains the priv-
ilege of being able to reappear above the normal
threshold. But ifits passage OUt ofconsciousness is
accompanied by dissociation, it rna)' continue to
exist as an unconscious psychical disposition or as
a co<onscious experience, and fomls an integral
part ofsome personalil)' .....hich ma)' or may not be
.....ider man that .....hich manifests in \\':lking life. ~ (PI'.
113-114)
McDougall (18i 1-1938), .....ho cited tJlis quot4:llion in his
major ....·ork on abnormal psychology. agreed completely
(1926),
1'hat is to say, we IIlUSt interpret the minor phe-
nomena of dissociation in the light of the major
165
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DISCUSSION
cases, the extreme cases in which the phenomena
lend themselves better to investigation. In all such
m~or cases, we find the dissociated activity to be
not something that can be adequately described as
an idea or a group or train of ideas, but rather the
self-conscious purposive thinking of a personality;
and, when we study the minor cases in the light of
the major cases, we see that the same is true of them.
Thus the agent that carries out a post-hypnotic sug-
gestion into effect as an "automatism" is not an iso-
lated idea or train of ideas, but a subordinate per-
sonality operating for the time being independently
of tl1e primary personality." (pp. 543-544)
Mitchell and McDougall are in agreement that the
actions performed by ego centers as agents may be automatic
to the habitual personality (or personal consciousness), even
when interpreted differently by tl1em. But automatic reacti-
vation of an ego center is also possible. And we should also
be aware that, as discussed above, dissociation as a direct
response to threat may be an entirely automatic process.
Ultimately, this is part of the more general phenomenon of
autonomous, emotional response patterns in the face of
threat which characterizes all of us (cf. LeDoux, 1996) .•
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